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PRICE CONTROL IN WAR PROCUREMENT
BRIG. GEN. ALBERT J. BROWNING
The aims and spirit of over-all renegotiation of war contracts have no-
where been more succinctly stated than in a recent advertisement by one
of the nation's largest war contractors. In a half-page message placed in
daily newspapers throughout the country, International Harvester Company
spoke of "the money you won't have to pay."1 Pertinent to any discussion
of controlling the prices of war materiel is the following excerpt from this
advertisement:
"Savings are what you get when -you put experienced, competent pro-
duction men on a new manufacturing job. Not at first, of course.
Those first guns and shells and airplanes are expensive. But as the
job runs on, the savings start to come. An, engineer designs a new tool
to reduce losses from spoiled work and to increase output. A foreman
relocates machines in his department to save 2 cents on each piece in
the handling of materials. An employee gets an idea and submits a
suggestion for better production to his Labor-Management Production
Drive Committee. All this, of course, while the quality of work is
maintained or improved, for quality always comes first.
"Small things? Yes. Small as so many drops of water. But when
you put together thousands of drops of water, you get an ocean. And
when you put together thousands of improvements and refinements in
manufacturing, you get a saving to make anybody blink.
"Consider the savings already made possible on three of tle many
war jobs the Harvester Company is doing-a 20 mm. aircraft cannon,
an anti-tank gun carriage, and the Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun mount.
"The price of the Oerlikon gun mount has been cut almost in half.
The price of the anti-tank gun carriage has been reduced one-third.
The original price of the 20-mm. cannon would buy two cannons now.
"On those three jobs the reductions in price our Company has made
to the government-which means to you who pay the government's
bills-amount to more than $16,000,000. That is the difference between
the original price and the price today. That is the savings, the money
you will not have to pay.
"These price reductions were voluntary. They stemmed from a
pledge, made officially by this Company, that we would handle all war
work at no more than a moderate profit, and that we would give the
1See The Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1943; and other leading newspapers.
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government the benefit of manufacturing savings by voluntarily re-
ducing prices whenever possible. That pledge was made before there
was any law regulating profits or prices on war production.
"Further savings will be made on these jobs. And savings will be
made on thousands of other jobs in the enormous war production pro-
gram of American industry."
The $16,000,000 savings effected on three items plus savings reported by
thousands of other American companies have resulted, in the sixteen months
through August, 1943, in refunds or price reductions on war material
totalling well over four billion dollars.2 It is estimated that no more than
approximately 70% of these refunds and price reductions would have been
recovered by taxes. The magnitude of this is indicated by the fact that the
more than $1,000,000,000 of net savings that would not have been recov-
ered by taxes represent approximately half of the total income taxes paid by
corporations and individuals in 1940. While it is difficult to estimate with
any high degree of accuracy the amount of net savings that will be effected
during the balance of this year, it is likely that the total will be materially
increased.
Thousands of American corporations are insuring the success of the
Govirnment's program to keep down the cost of the war. As indicated in
the advertisement quoted above, management "know-how" combined with
labor "know-how" and added to substantially increased volume of produc-
tion have made it possible to reduce the cost of things necessary to the
winning of the war. And agreements to reduce prices and to make refunds
to the Government, as the advertisement also suggests, have been voluntary
on the part of industry.
Those two elements are inherent in war contract renegotiation-lower
prices through increased efficiency and price adjustment through voluntary
agreement.
I. BACKGROUND OF PRICE CONTROL
A. Early Methods in the United States
The need for price adjustment on war contracts is not new or peculiar to
this war. It has been present in every war in which this country has en-
gaged. By its very nature, war upsets normal economic equilibrium. This
becomes increasingly mechanized and geographically extensive. Shortages
of every sort develop, breaking all the laws of supply and demand which,
2See text pp. 172-173-infra.
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in peace-times, tend to irovide some semblance of stability in the price
structure.
More than a century and a half ago George Washington was confronted
with the problem of controlling prices of material for his Colonials. So
concerned was he about the problem that he wrote numerous letters about it,
among others one to the President of Congress5 about "the exorbitant price
exacted by merchants and vendors of goods for every necessary they dispose
of. I am sensible the trouble and risk in importing give a right to a gen-
erous price, and that such, from the motives of policy, should be paid; but
yet I cannot conceive that they, in direct violation of every principle of
generosity, of reason, and of justice, should be allowed, if it is possible
to restrain them, to avail *themselves of the difficulties of the times, and
to amass fortunes upon the public ruin."
The "trouble and the risk" to which the first President alluded remain in
all instances of war production, and so, too, there remains the recognition
that these factors "give a right to a generous price." At the same time,
Washington's hypothesis that producers of war materiel and services should
'not "avail themselves of the difficulties of the times" or "amass fortunes
upon the public ruin" is widely recognized throughout the world today
not only by the men who fight and by those who foot the bill, but by the
very producers themselves.
During the Spanish-American War Congress passed the first law de-
signed to control the price of materiel when it limited the price of armor
plate. In World War I another step along the road of sound price control
was taken with the "cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost" contracts. These boom-
eranged, however, for they provided an incentive not to reduce costs but
to increase them, since a profit of 10% on $200 is just twice as great as
a profit of 10% on $100. Likewise, the excess profits tax instituted during_
the World War I provided incentive to increase prices with the view to
having the increased 'price cover the increased tax.
The most potentially effective step to control prices of World War I
materiel, however, was taken more than a month before this country became
a belligerent.4 The Naval Affairs Appropriation Act of March 4, 1917,
gave the President power to "take immediate possession of any factory of
such person" who refused or failed to give to the United-States preference
in the execution of orders "at such reasonable price as'shall be determined
by the President." While this Act also gave the president power to take
3 EiSNER & ROSENBLUm, GEORGE WASHINGTON ON PRicE CONTROL.4Naval Services Appropriation Act, 39 STAT. 1193 (1917).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
other action, the section quoted iepresents the nub of the attempt on the
part of Congress to control prices in time of war. The phrase, "such rea-
sonable price as shall be determined by the President," is used again later
in the Act, but the Act also recognized that contractors are entitled to a
fair profit, for it gave the Secretary of the Navy the right to contract for
the construction of battle cruisers "upon the basis of actual cost, plus a
reasonable profit to be determined by him."
B. Survey of Foreign Methods
Meantime, with the advent of the war in Europe in 1939, England,
Canada, Australia, Germany, and Italy tackled the problem of controlling
the prices of war materiel. Significantly, in England, as in the United States,
those who have opposed renegotiation have contended that it is more im-
portant to produce than to keep costs down. This argument, which appears
sound on the surface, is fallacious. During wartime it is against the public
interest to waste manpower, money and materials. Production at all costs
will contribute to post-war economic ills. The British view is best stated
as follows :r
"The effort to maintain or restore some incentive to cheap production,
which is the object of modification or adjustments in renegotiated con-
tracts, has been disparaged on the ground that output is more important
than price and that attempts to effect paltry economies may seriously
disturb the productive organization. The answer to this lies in the rela-
tion between costs and efficiency, which experience shows to be so close
that maximum output is unlikely to be attained under conditions in
which costs are to any considerable extent above the minimum. Un-
willingness to press for a return to fixed prices seems to be associated
with the misapprehension that maximum output and economy are dis-
tinct and frequently incompatible items."
In England prices are controlled in large measure through attention to
costs and profits. The costing system has prevailed, and policies on profits
have emphasized return on capital employed. The rate which is generally
recognized as fair in England would shock most American war contractors,
for it represents a return on employed capital of only 72 per cent before
taxes. This, however, is modified by the performance factor, contractors
being rewarded upon the basis of whether their performance has been good,
bad or indifferent. In England, inefficient contractors are given short shrift.
If such a contractor cannot step up his efficiency, his employees are as like
6Select Committee on Natl. F xpenditures, Fourth Report, Section 1940-41.
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as not to be assigned to another plant and he himself to a job as an assistant
superintendent elsewhere.
In England, too, the whole emphasis is on profit before taxes-which
means, of course, on prices without regard to taxes.
The Canadian government has had an easier problem with wartime profit
control because a large portion of the munitions are manufactured in govern-
ment plants, where costs are known and where spot checks are made.
Originally, some contracts were negotiated on a cost-plus-fixed fee basis,
with an added percentage being allowed, for reduction in costs. Later this
practice was abandoned in favor of so-called target-price c6ntracts.6 "
The target system, used in Canada and Great Britain in the early stages
of the war, operated as follows: Firms manufacturing new articles were
given a set price. For example, if forceps were being produced for the first
time, the price might have been set at i1 each. The contract and cost prices
were re-examined at the end of a specified period and the price was reduced.
There was no effort, however, to recapture profits on a retroactive basis as
is practiced under the renegotiation law of the United States.
The target system was abandoned because it was determined that if
enough information was available to set a target price, a fixed price could
be based on that same information. At the present time both Canada's and
Great Britain's prices are controlled, in the main, by a system of post-
auditing, which obviously involves the use of specialized manpower.
Another marked difference in wartime manufacturing in Canada is that
the large contracts are carried out by about twenty government companies,
operated by business men. Spot checks on costs are constantly made.
Turning to Australia, we find that the Supply Act of 19397 specifically
required the control of costing and the limitation of profits. An "Accounting
Panel" laid down broad general principles. It was recognized that the
ordinary contract system of awards to the lowest or most attractive bidders
was not appropriate to specialized munitions, and soon became futile for
ordinary supplies because of congestion, inefficient workshops, and the lack
of any real competition. Allowances are lower on war supplies than on
civil supplies, since selling costs may not be included. The virtual centraliza-
tion of authority in the Munitions Director of Finance, and the confidence
felt in his judgment both by the manufacturers and the Treasury have
usually provided a solution for particular problems.
6Stam, Handling of War Contracts in Canada and Great Britain, Hearings before
Sen. Fin. Subcom. on Sec. 403 of Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 77-79.7 Supply and Development Act of 1939, COMMONWEALTH STATUTORY RULES OF 1939,
pp. 670-706.
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As might be expected, Germany, which for long before the war, of course,
had close control over prices, systematized its control over prices of war
materiel on a basis which ruled out all sentiment. The Nazis realized that
profiteering in World War 'I had contributed to disintegration of civilian
and military- morale.8 In 1941 they adopted a form of contract renegotia-
tion. Significantly, they stated frankly that such measures were put into
force in order to obtain production efficiency. 9
German munitions makers are placed in two groups. Group I, or the low-
cost war producers, are rewarded handsomely by the government through
the expedient of forgiving excess war profits taxes over and above levels
fixed by the Minister of Economics. Group II, or inefficient producers,
must not only pay heavy taxes, but are threatened with the penalty of
losing raw materials and manpower if they do not produce efficiently.
Italy, too, for a long time had price controls in effect before the war.
But if word reaching beyond the bordirs of Fortress Europe is to be taken
at its' face value, it was some time before the Fascists became aware of
the need of applying controls to war production. A Reuter's dispatch'0
from London on April 24 of this year told that the Rome radio had said
that the then Premier Mussolini had just given orders for a cut in state
payments to contractors. " 'When arrangements have to be made in a
hurry the state often accepts prices which turn out far too high,' Mussolini
told the commission for revision of war contracts," according to the dis-
patch. Reuter's continued its report as follows: "Revision of these prices
has now become necessary for political and moral, as' well as for financial
reasons. Mussolini ordered the commission to 'cut out all profits which
are not justified by the amount of capital engaged in the business or work
done.' "
It will be noted that, in its control of prices, Italy, like'England, places
emphasis on the capital investment of a war contractor.
Another one of the great belligerents, Russia, of course has relatively
no problem of controlling either prices or profits, being without a profit
system such as is utilized in capitalistic nations.
What the practice of price control in wartime Japan may be it has been
impossible to ascertain.
8General Ludendorff is reported to have said:
"Profiteering was a deadly sin, and our inability to eradicate it was a matter
of greatest regret to me from the point of view of morale. Many times I made
an effort'to get at the bottom of it. The war profiteer is a loathsome phenome-
non and the conception of his, influence have done us incalculable harm."9See DOBLIN, SUBCONTRACTING IN GERMAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES.
IOReported in Washington Times-Herald, April 24, 1943.
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So it is found that the important warring nations of each side have de-
veloped a system of price and profit control. Like the airplane, it is a modem
wartime phenomenon, a development which became necessary because of
the scope of modem war, its complexities, and the intense use of materiel
on a scale never before contemplated, and also because of the importance
of the morale of civilians and of the men who are doing the actual fighting.
C. Price Control During World War I
Returning to our own history of price control of war materiel in this
country, general limitations on costs in contracts in the last war were drawn
up by a committee composed of representatives of both Congress and the
Executive departments of the Government. The proposals were issued in
July, 1917, under the title of "Uniform Contracts and Cost Accounting
Definitions and Methods," forming'the first basis for control of costs."
A straight purchase-and-sale contract was recommended by the conference
in July, 1917, as possibly the best method of keeping costs down. The
formula was not rigid, however, the conference recognizing that new arma-
ments present cost problems not covered by the original recommendations.
As a consequence, cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts were to be per-
mitted.
The conference even set forth the items which were to be included in the
over-all formula for determining costs. These were direct labor and mate-
rials, and a fair proportion of overhead. Excluded in computing overhead
were interest, rent, advertising, collection expenses, credit losses, customers'
discounts, and federal income and excess profits taxes.
Allowable items in the contract price were io include, among others:
spoiled work not due to negligence, accrued liability insurance, taxes (ex-
cept federal excess profit and incomi taxes), administrative expenses, em-
ployees' welfare, packing, depreciation and depletion.
On the basis of the joint conference's recommendations, the Navy De-
partment adopted a standard cost-plus contract form, which was strongly
criticized in post-war years and which led to demands for adoption of an
elastic formula. The criticism leveled at cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost con-
tracts, perhaps more than any other factor, led to the subsequent joint
recommendation by the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments to
sponsor an elastic formula for price and profit control.
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1917, as has been indicated above, Con-
lScHWVARTZ, PROFIT LImITATIoI s: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR I (War Service
Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).
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giess had granted the Secretaries of War and Navy authority to place' com-
pulsory orders for. goods with manufacturers and even to commandeer their
plants if they failed to furnish supplies "at a reasonable price as deter-
mined" by the Secretaries. 12
In effect this authority vested in the Army and Navy power to requisition
or commandeer not only manufacturing facilities, but also raw materials.
To carry out commandeering operations the Navy Department created in
1917 a board known as the Naval Board of Commandeering and Appraisal.
Commandeering was used as a profit control measure by the Navy, as in
the case of tin. In 1918 tin prices had risen to abnormally high levels and
there was considerable hoarding. This critical metal was actually unobtain-
able in the open market. To break the back of the corner, the Navy issued
a blanket commandeering order to the important tin brokers. When this
became known, considerable quantities of the metal were released in the
market, causing a price decline.
.The War Department created a board of appraisers to fix compensation
for property requisitioned by the Secretary of War.13 Some of the com-
modities commandeered or requisitioned by the Army included wool, cotton,
heavy duck, and canned goods.
Generally speaking commandeering was not used extensively. In recal-
citrant cases, however, the power which the Congress vested in the War
and Navy Departments was extremely important. A student of the subject,
J. F. Crowell, has cited the following as conditions justifying the use of the
commandeering authority :14
"(1) Where the partial or complete breakdown has occurred- of the
usual economic conditions under which values are determinable with any
approach to fairness and justice, on the ordinary basis of supply and de-
mand for services and goods.
"(2) Where the tendency of the trade is, in anticipation of scarcity con-
cition of supply, to accumulate unduly large quantities for speculative con-
trol and extortion of unreasonably high prices from the public powers and
private necessity..
"(3) Where there is'unwillingness to bring holders of commodities and
of individual and corporate services to recognize a common basis of obliga-
tion not to take advantage of a national emergency by putting personal
profit above collective welfare in the hour of national peril.
1239 STAT. 213 (1917).
'
3 War Dept. General Order No. 39 (April 1, 1918).
14CROWELL, GOVERNMENT WAR CONTRACTS (1920) 48-49.
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"(4) Where the unwillingness to accept compensation on the basis of
actual costs plus reasonable profit becomes a serious handicap to the rate of
speed and effectiveness of mobilization of national resources.
"(5) Where commandeering may be required to forestall or prevent the
quick rise in the costs of living superinduced by the race for excessive profits
and extortionate wages exacted by the crisis in public existence.
"(6) Where it is difficult or impossible to recoup the extraordinary need
for public revenues from taxes on excess profits and unearned income from
salaries and wages or other sources."
Another important phase of wartime profit control was price-fixing car-
ried out by the War Industries Board and the Price Fixing Committee
appointed by President Wilson on March 14, 1918. The Board and the
Price Fixing Committee fixed-the prices on a majority of the basic war
materials, but the War and Navy Departments also fixed "fair and reason-
able" prices for materials they themselves bought.
In addition to these measures, corporation taxes and excess profits taxes
were used not only to help in financing the war out of current revenue, but
also as brakes against excessive profits accruing to war contractors. That
this financial war mobilization program was not sufficient to stem profiteer-
ing and inflation tides is attested by the post-war public and Congressional
revulsion against war profiteers.
II. SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION, 1919-1940
A total of 168 resolutions and bills were introduced in Congress between
1919 and the fall of France in June, 1940, all having the avowed purpose
of taking the profit out of war, a slogan which gained nationwide publicity
under the impetus of the American Legion's campaign.
The first attempt to provide for legislative means to limit war profits is
credited to the late Senator Lundeen of Minnesota. As a member of the
House he introduced on February 28, 1919, a bill 5 to provide for govern-
ment monopoly in the manufacture and sale of munitions of war. Mr.
Lundeen's bill was aimed at the future war profiteer.
In the following year, Representative Little of Kansas went a little fur-
ther. He offered a resolution 16 in the House instructing the Attorney Gen-
eral to restrain the distribution of war profits and instructing the House
Ways and Means Committee to devise a plan to tax these profits for vet-
erans' benefits.
15H. R. REP. No. 16, 65tlh Cong., 3d Sess. (1919).16H. J. REs. No. 315, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
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These initial attempts were simply Congress' recognition of national agi-
tation against the war profiteer. Their genesis lies in the fact that dis-
satisfaction after the Armistice let-down was not confined to the demobilized
army, but spread to civilians.
Between 1920 and 1930 Congress was pre-occupied off and on with the
problem of controlling war profits and mobilizing national resources in time
of war. The driving force behind these efforts was the American Legion
which adopted a program envisaging "universal legislation" to equalize
the burdens of war.
In 1922 Representative McSwain of South Carolina introduced a reso-
lution 7 providing for the creation of a Congressional committee to investi-
gate the subject of taking the profit out of war. Representative McSwain's
proposal had the indorsement of President Warren G. Harding. In one of
his last public addresses, the President said:
"I have said before, and I choose to repeat it very deliberately now, that
if war must come again-God grant that it shall not-then we must draft
all of the nation in carrying it on .... It will be righteous and just, it will
'be more effective in war and marked by less regret in the aftermath if we
draft all of capital, all of industry, all of agriculture, all of commerce, all
of talent and capacity of energy of every description to make the supreme
and united and unselfish fight for the national triumph. When we do that,
there will be less war. When we do that, the contest will be aglow with
unsullied patriotism, untouched ,by profiteering in any service."
Harding was but. one of five presidents vho have endorsed universal legis-
lation and elimination of war profiteering.
Between 1922 and 1924 ten more bills and resolutions' 8 were introduced
in Congress for control of wartime profits, but Congress took no action. In
1924 Republicans and Democrats alike took cognizance of the movement
for profit controls, both adopting platforms during the 1924 conventions
for universal service in time of war.
The 1924 Democratic platform read :19
"In the event of war in which the manpower of the nation is drafted, all
other resources should likewise be drafted. This will tend to discourage
war by depriving it of its profits."
17H. J. REs. No. 400, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922).
18H. R. REP. No. 13201, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922) ; H. J. RF-s. Nos. 76 and 85,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (192,3) ; H. R. REPs. Nos. 4841, 5332, and 8111, H. J. RF-s. Nos. 128
and 271, H. REs. No. 183, and SEE. REP. No. 2561, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
19 See Republican Campaign Text Book of 1924 at 85; Democratic Campaign Book of
1924 at 39.
-[Vol. 29
PRICE CONTROL AND RENEGOTIATION
The 1924 Republican platform statement read :20
"We believe that in time of war the nation should draft for its defenses
not only its citizens but also every resource which may contribute to suc-
cess. The country demands that should the United States, ever again be
called upon to defend itself by arms, the President be empowered to draft
such material resources .and such services as may be required, and to sta-
bilize prices of services and essential commodities, whether utilized in actual
warfare or private activity."
The first definite step taken in the direction of controlling war profits
was in 1930 when Congress, by joint resolution 21 created the War Policies
Commission to "study and consider amending the constitution of the United
States to provide that private property may be taken by Congress for public
use during war, and methods of equalizing the burdens and to remove the
profits of war, together with a study of policies to be pursued in the event
of war."
The Commission held hearings in March and May, 1931, and submitted
its recommendations to the President in March, 1932. It devoted consider-
able testimony to the problems of minimizing war profits and concluded
that controls could be adopted through price-fixing. However, it significantly
recognized that profits would accrue to low-cost producers and recommended
that these should be taxed.
Proposals submitted by the War Policies Commission were not acted upon,
but they did accomplish one purpose: They laid the groundwork for the
munitions investigations, which excoriated all industry because of the mis-
takes and the greediness of the minority. Senator Gerald P. Nye (R., N. D.),
and Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg (R., Mich.), introduced a joint reso-
lution 22 in the Senate for an investigation of the munitions industry.
The committee, popularly known as the Nye Committee, held extensive
hearings from the fall of 1934 to the spring of 1936. The newspaper pub-
licity attendant upon these hearings was, to say the least, damaging to
industry as a whole. The* depredations of a few industrialists smeared the
whole system of private enterprise. Such headlines as these appeared in
the nation's press: "Senator Charges Profiteers Plot Another Conflict,"
"War 'Profits' Become War Debts," "Voters Against Private Munitions
Manufacture in National Poll," "Senate Committee Asks U. S. Ownership
of War Facilities," "Democratic Women Urge Peace Plank and War Profit
2Obid.
2146 STAT. 825 (1930).22SEN. REs. No. 206, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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Ban," "Senators Urge Nationalization of Arms Plants," "Munition Makers
Can't Be Trusted, Probers Declare."
Of cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contracts, the Munitions Investigating
Committee said :2
"The Committee finds: . . . that the record of the present ship-
building companies during the war wherever examined, was close to
being disgraceful.
"They made considerable profits. On Treasury audits they secured
cost-plus contracts and added questionable charges to the cost. They
took their profits on these ships after the wartime taxes had been re-
pealed. They secured changes in contract dates to avoid war taxes. They
bought from the goverment, very cheaply, yards which had been built
expensively at government costs. In one case this was pre-arranged
before the yard was built. One yard did not build necessary additions
until it was threatened with being commandeered. Knowingly exorbitant
claims were filed -against the government for cancellation (of con-
tracts). Huge bonuses were paid to officers. Profits were concealed as
rentals.
"After the war was over keels for $181,247,000 worth of destroyers
were laid, which was probably the largest post-war favor done by any
government to any munitions group.
"The committee finds no assurance in the wartime history of these
companies to lead it to believe that they would suddenly change their
spots in the case of another war."
One of the first men to recognize the failure of a stiff excess profits tax
to eliminate unconscionable war profits was Bernard M. Baruch, head of
the War Industries Board in World War I, and an advisor to President
Roosevelt in this war. Thstifying before the War Policies Commission, Mr.
Baruch had this to say about the excess profits tax as a profit inflation
antidote:
"Excess profits (taxes) standing alone have no effect whatever to
check inflation. Their only effect is to increase it. Thus twenty per
cent of $500,000 is $100,000 and 20 per cent of $1,000,000 is $200,000.
One way to increase $500,000 profit to $1,000,000 without increased risk
or effort is to double the price. For this reason there is more incentive
to increase prices-and, therefore, profits-under an 80 per cent excess
profits tax than there is without it. Indeed, the main result of such a
system is to induce rapid price increase to absorb the tax. Precisely
because it accelerates and in no-wise checks inflation the excess profits
tax-without more-offers no cure at all for war evils. On the contrary
it aggravates them."
That war profits spiraled in World War I despite heavy taxes and even
23SEN. REP. No. 944, part 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 9.
'[Vol. 29
PRICE CONTROL AND RENEGOTIATION
before this country entered the conflict is shown in the following statistics:
Profits after taxes as a percentage of sales in the case of sugar companies
advanced from 102 per cent in 1915 to 19.1 per cent in 1916; indus-
trial chemicals from 12.6 per cent to 20.1 percent; machinery from 11.1
per cent to 22.7 percent; petroleum products from 18.6 per cent to 35.4
per cent; coke from 13.3 per cent to 81.9 per cent.2 4
The post-war revelations of huge profits led to wide agreement that in a
national emergency every person and every element, whether it be economic
or financial, should be conscripted to wage war against the enemy. It also
led to wide agreement that profits in the time of war should be limited.
However, it was not until 1934 that the first profit limitation measure was
actually adopted by Congress. In that year, the Congress enacted the Vinson
Act25 which set profit limits on naval contracts. In 1936 it passed the profit
limitations Merchant Marine Act.26 The Vinson Act was subsequently
amended limiting profits on naval contracts to 8, 10 and 12 per cent. 7
The Vinson Act significantly set a rigid profit limit, despite overwhelming
evidence that inflexible profit limits work to the advantage of some corn-
panies and to the disadvantage of others.
These earlier experiments with profit control sufficed because the United
States was not at war. However, certain members of the Congress had been
preparing for profit limitation controls if the United States was involved in
the conflict. At the outbreak of the European war Senator Bone introduced
a measure28 for himself and forty-nine other senators proposing a 99 per
cent excess profits tax on the income of all individuals exceeding $20,000,
and suggested that all corporate income in excess of 6 per cent of an ad-
justed capital stock value should be confiscated.
Senator Connally in 1939 also introduced "a bill 29 carrying a top tax rate
of 80 per cent for individuals whose surtax net income exceeded $50,000,
and varying schedules for corporations, which were divided into five sepa-
rate classes for tax purposes. Both the Bone and Connally bills were in line
with the proposals made by the War Policies Commission to Presidents
Hoover in 1932 to avert recurrence of World War I events, if the United
24Manly, Have Profits Kept Pace With the Cost of Living? (1920) 89 AxNASs OF
Am. AcAD. oF PoLi. & Soc. Sci. 157.
2548 STAT. 503 (1934), 34 U. S. C. §§ 494, 495 (1940).
2649 STAT. 1985 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 1101 (1940).
2749 STAT. 1926 (1936), 34 U. S. C. § 496 (1940). See Walsh, History of Profit
Limitations on War Contracts, Hearings before Sen. Fin. Subcom. on Sec. 403 of
Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 74.2 8SEN. REP. No. 1885, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.'41939).
29SEN. REP. No. 2160, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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States again was engaged by enemies. The commission had proposed in that
year a war profits tax that would tax profits of individuals and corporations
at 95 per cent.
III. RENEGOTIATION-1943 STYLE
With the outbreak of World War II, it soon became apparent that it
would be necessary to place contracts for materiel and services in unprece-
dented volume, and that a very substantial portion of the materiel required
for the prosecution of the war would involve items with which both con-
tractors and contracting officers had had no experience. Early in 1942,
shortly after I was appointed Chief of the Purchases Branch of the War
Department, two developments indicated that the unprecedented nature and
volume of war products would lead inevitably to the realization of exces-
sive war profits. Annual financial reports 6f war contractors began appear-
ing in the newspapers. These reflected tremendously increased profits de-
rived from the defense program of 1941. It became increasingly evident
that, with the substantial increase in expenditures for war, corporate profits
on war contracts would be even higher than they had been on defense
contracts.
A. Beginnings of Renegotiation
In the meantime, the Congress had become concerned about the reportedly
large profits being realized by one of the nation's leading contractors, Jack &
Heintz, Inc., of Cleveland, Ohio. On March 23, 1942, the House Naval
Affairs Committee of Congress conducted a hearing3 0 on the profits of Jack
& Heintz, Inc., at which were divulged facts about officer and employee
bonuses and high profits in terms of invested capital, -which received a
large amount of sensational publicity in the press of the nation. That same
night, with other representatives of the Purchases Branch, I met with
officials of Jack & Heintz for the purpose of reviewing the firm's contracts
with the War Department. The meeting resulted in an agreement on the
part of the" company to reduce its prices on individual contracts, totaling
slightly over $50,000,000, by an over-all amount slightly in excess of
$10,000,000. This was the first instance of over-all renegotiation of contracts
based on anticipated profits in World War II and, so far as I know, the
first instance in which a war contractor, through negotiation with repre-
sentatives of the Government, voluntarily agreed to broad-scale price reduc-
tions on its contracts in view of anticipated profits. It was formalized when,
3OHeariWgs before House Naval Affairs Comm. on H. Res. No. 162 (vol. 1; Mar. 23,
1942) 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
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under date of April 1, the company furnished us with a" detailed schedule
of existing contracts with the War Department, showing old and new unit
prices on each item and aggregate prices on each contract.
On March 28, another similar meeting was held with the officials of
Continental Motors Corporation, which resulted in a voluntary agreement
on their part to reduce prices on existing contracts for a total of $40,000,000.
On April 6, a meeting was held with a third. company, The Sperry Corpora-
tion, whose officials willingly and promptly effected price reductions in the
aggregate amount of $100,000,000.31
B. Price Adjustment Board
In the meantime, under date of March 27, a memorandum3 2 was prepared,
3 tIn The Sperry Corporation's Annual Report to its stockholders for 1942, the fol-
lowing statement was made:'
"In estimating prices on contracts for many new products developed by the
company, it was necessary to provide for a number of contingencies in the manu-
facture of such products, the contract for some of which ran as long as two
years. Results achieved by us in the manufacture of both the newly developed
and the standard products have exceeded our expectations. As a consequence,,
our profits before taxes have been larger than was anticipated or desired.
While our over-all margin of profit was somewhat less than the normal peace-
time margin, your management was in accord with the prevailing thought that
there should be 'a reduction in rates of profit during the war period. Accord-
ingly, your company was one of the first to propose to the Government a sub-
stantial reduction in its anticipated profits on its contracts. Shortly thereafter,
Congress passed a law providifig for the renegotiation of profits on war con-
tracts. Your management believes that renegotiation is the fairest means of
adjusting the ,profits on contracts for the many and varied types of products
being produced for the war. Any flat yardstick would have resulted in many
inequities and hardships !"32Among other sections in the memorandum are the following:
Operating Policies
The following principles will be observed by the Price Adjustment Board in dealings
with contractors:
1. The Board will endeavor to arrange for a readjustment in contract price or to
obtain a return of payments made pursuant to a contract to the extent which will result
in limiting the contractor to a fair and reasonable profit.
2. In judging the reasonableness of profit, the Board will consider:
(a) the total profit made 'by the contractor before allowance for federal income
and excess profit tax.
(b) the amount of profit per unit based on estimated or actual cost.
3. In determining the estimated or actual cost per unit of performance of the con-
tract, the Board will give consideration to all items of cost, including the following:
A. Factory Cost:
1. Direct materials
2. Direct productive labor
3. Direct engineering labor
4. Miscellaneous direct factory charges
5. Indirect factory expenses
B. Other manufacturing costs
C. Miscellaneous direct expenses
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outlining the "Policy and Procedure" of what we described as the War
Department Price Adjustment Board. Because this memorandum was pre-
pared one month before the enactment of what was to become known as
the Renegotiation Statute, it is interesting to note the similarity between
the policies and procedures laid down therein and the policies and pro-
cedures prescribed in a Joint Statement of the War, Navy, and Treasury
Departments and the Maritime Commission one year later, under date of
March 31, 1943.8' The preamble to the-memorandum of the Price Adjust-
ment Board, captioned "Purpose of the Board", reads as follows:
"The Price Adjustment Board will serve as a focal point for the re-
view of contracts existing between the War Department and its con-
tractors. Its duties will be to make sure that the War Department is
doing an economical job of purchasing and that contractors are not
making excess or unreasonable profits on war orders. In its review of
contractor profits the Board will endeavor to eliminate from contractor
cost calculations exorbitant items of whatever nature.
"The Board will assist the Services in securing an adjustment in
contract prices that will accomplish the foregoing objectives.
"The Board will also serve contractors who feel that their contract
prices are such that a likelihood exists that they will make excessive
or unreasonable profits. It will invite war contractors finding themselves
in this position to consult with it for the purpose of arriving at a fair
and equitable voluntary adjustment."
Prescribed principles to be observed by the Board in dealing with con-
tractors, cost factors to be considered in determining the estimated or actual
cost per unit of performance of the contract, and general factors to be con-
sidered in determining the amount of profit to be viewed as reasonable
D. Indirect engineering expenses
E. Expenses of distribution, servicing and administration
F. Guarantee expenses
4. The Board will in general be guided by the cost accounting system regularly
utilized by the contractor, except that the Board will, in appropriate cases, disallow
salaries, bonuses or other expenditures which are clearly excessive. * * *
6. In cases where performance has been substantially or wholly completed, considera-
tion will be given to the extent to which the contractor has met or anticipated delivery
schedules.
7. The Board shall'not be limited to the foregoing factors but may give considera-
tion to any other factors which in its judgment are reasonably applicable.The Price Adjustment Board function will be completed when an agreement is ar-
rived at with the contractor setting a limiting figure that shall be considered a reason-
able profit before federal income and excess profit taxes. From this point forward, it
is contemplated that the contractor will renegotiate contracts with the Service or
Services involved so as to bring its total profit down to the agreed upon figure.33See C. C. H. War Law Service (Govt. Contracts 2) ff 27,275.
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were identical to those which have been followed consistently by the War
Department Price Adjustment Board under the Renegotiation Statute.
Steps had been taken to assemble a Board personnel, and within several
weeks a number of business and professional leaders had agreed to serve as
members of the first War Department Price Adjustment Board.
C. The Renegotiation Statute
During this time, the Congress began consideration of the Sixth Supple-
mental National Defense Appropriations Act of 1942.34 In the course of
the debate on this Act, the House adopted by a vote of 70 to 8 the so-called
Case Amendment, placing a 6,per cent profit limitation on war contracts. The
amendment was rejected by the Senate.
At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Appro-
priations, the Chairman of the War Production Board, and representatives
of the War and Navy Departments agreed to submit suggestions to the
Subcommittee for a substitute method of preventing excessive profits on
war contracts.
Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces,
presented the substitute which was based on the theory that if every con-
tract price could be pre-examined by the parties in the light of actual experi-
ence under the contract, it should be possible to eliminate the bulk of
excessive profits. No compulsion upon the contractor was' contemplated
other than that he:
(1) Furnish adequate data as to actual and legitimate costs; and
(2) In the light of such data, bargain in good faith, for the purpose of
readjusting the contract price.3 5
In opposing a set profit limitation the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Robert
P. Patterson, gave members of the Subcommittee the following reasons:
"(1) Effect of costs: In our view, the control of profits is an integral
part of the problem of controlling costs and prices, and any method must
be evaluated by its effects on all three aspects. From this point of view we
feel that renegotiation is far superior to a fixed percentage limitation.
"(2) Uniformity: In the second place, a flat percentage limitation does
not really achieve its prime objective of uniformity of treatment. Although
it allows a fixed uniform per cent of profit on gross sales, this will be
most unfair as applied to the diverse types of business engaged in war
3456 STAT. 245, 50 U. S. C. § 1191 (Supp. 1942).35See Testimony of Under-Secretary of War Patterson at Hearings before Sen. Fin.
Subcom. on Sec. 403 of Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 3.
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work. It takes no account of the fact that in different lines of business the
same volume of sales may require widely different amounts of capital, skill,
and work, depending on the rate of turnover."
In the course of his testimony, Mr. Patterson emphasized that even if
the renegotiation statute were repealed, the Technical Services of the Army
and the Army Air Forces would continue their duty of supervising prices
of contractors and subcontractors. The obligation would still remain to "buy
right" and the task would have to be performed by the services as part
of their procurement function.
Section 403,36 enacted April 28, 1942, and thrice amended, provides for
adjustment, accomplished through over-all renegotiation of certain i;ar con-
tracts and subcontracts. Renegotiation has been conducted by the Price
Adjustment Board of either the Army, Navy, Treasury, War Shipping Ad-
ministration, Maritime Commission, or Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
whichever has generally the dollar preponderance of contracts with the
company in question. In large measure this policy has resulted in making
assignments by industries, the Office of the Quartermaster General being
assigned most of the textile and food contractors, Army Air Forces having
most of the aircraft companies, the Surgeon General most of the medical
supply contracts, etc. In the interest of promoting greater uniformity of
treatment, assignment by industries rather than by preponderance of dollar
volume of contracts is now being emphasized to a greater extent than in the
early stages of renegotiation.
Contractors and subcontractors whose aggregate renegbtiable sales are
less than $100,000 in a fiscal year are exempted.37 [For brokers and agents,
the exemption'is $25,000.] The War and Navy Departments have suggested
that this exemption should be increased to $500,000. Also exempted are
prime contracts and subcontracts made with. other federal or local govern-
,ment agencies or a foreign government 8 and those which are for the product
of a mine, oil, or gas well, or other mineral or natural deposit or timber
which has not been processed, refined or treated beyond the first form or
state suitable for industrial use. 9 Other exemptions include contracts with
public utilities and railroads, and contracts for perishable foods.40
Excessive profits are determined by an over-all study of a company's finan-
cial position. Except for most construction contracts, the profits, past and
36Pub. L. No. 528, § 403, 56 STAT. 245, 50 U. S. C. § 1191 (Supp. 1942).
3 7 Id. at (c) (6) (iii).
381d. at (i) (1) (i).391d. at (Q) (1) 00f.
4O1d. at (i) (2) (i).
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prospective, from its contracts are usually taken as a whole rather than
by analyzing each individual contract on a unit cost basis. The statute does
not confer any authority of renegotiation with respect to profits other than
war contracts41 and all commercial or non-war profits are segregated and
no renegotiation with respect thereto takes place. The statute provides that
a renegotiation clause shall be inserted in every war contract of $100,000
or more,4 2 although the omission of this clause on smaller contracts does
not of itself exempt them from renegotiation. 42,
Perhaps the most important function of renegotiation is to encourage
price reductions-and increase efficiency. Thus it is that, in determining the
margin of profit to which a contractor is entitled, consideration is given to
the manner in which his operations compare with those of other contractors
with respect -to the applicable factors. Among the factors taken into con-
sideration are the following:
(a) Price reductions and comparative prices.
(b) Efficiency in reducing costs.
(c) Economy in the use of raw materials.
(d) Efficiency in the use of facilities, and in the conservation of man-
power.
(e) Character and extent of subcontracting.
(f) Quality of production.
(g) Complexity of manufacturing technique.
(h) Rate of delivery and turnover.
(i) Inventive and developmental contribution with respect to impor-
tant war products.
(j) Co-operation with the Government and with other contractors in
developing and supplying technical assistance to alternative or
competitive sources of supply and the effect thereof on the con-
tractor's future peacetime business.
(k) Nature of capital at risk: whether the contractor's or the Gov-
ernment's.
(I) Timing of contractor's contribution: whether early in the pro-
duction program at considerable risk or later at less risk.
(m) Recognition of special problems confronted by high-cost pro-
ducers whose production is essential despite handicaps beyond the
contractor's control.
41The authority delegated by the statute is limited to the Secretaries of the "Depart-
ments." [50 U. S. C. § 1191 (b).3 "Departments" is defined in the statute to include
only the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments, the Maritime Commission, Defense
Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber
Reserve Company. There is only one Price Adjustment Board for the last four. [Id.
at (a) (1).]
421d. at (b).42
*See C. C. H. War Law Service (Govt. Contracts 2) ff 27,284,50.
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(n) Fair return in relation to sales and to net worth or capital
investment.
Consideration is also given to possible increases in cost of materials, immi-
nent wage increases, and the risks assumed by a contractor such as inex-
perience in new types of production, delays from inability to obtain mate-
rials, rejections, spoilage, "cut-backs" in quantities, and guarantees of
quality and performance of the product. It is also recognized that a con-
tractor whose pricing policy results in comparatively reasonable profits is
entitled-to more favorable treatment than a contractor whose pricing policy
results in a large amount of unreasonable profits unless this is attributable
to reduced costs rather than over-pricing. The contractor who maintains
only a reasonable margin of profit is subjected to the risks incident to the
performance of a fixed price contract, while the contractor who practices
over-pricing usually has taken few, if any, of such risks, for he has an
ample cushion to protect himself against rising costs. In the latter case, the
profit of the contractor should be adjusted in the direction of the fee that
might have been allowed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the produc-
tion of similar articles.
The contractor in every instance is given ample opportunity to develop
and present facts with respect to all of the above factors, and to any other
factors which in his particular case may be relevant to his over-all quality
of performance, upon which his profit reward is based.
Excessive profits realized, or likely to be realized, may be eliminated in
various ways :43
(1) By reduction in the contract price of the contract or subcontract,
or by other revision in its terms;
(2) By withholding from amounts, otherwise due to the contractor or
subcontractor, any amount of excessive profits;
(3) By directing a contractor to withhold for the account of the
United States, from amounts otherwise due to the subcontractor,
any amount of excessive profits under the subcontract;
(4) By recovery from the contractor or subcontractor, through re-
payment, credit, or suit of any amount of excessive profits actu-
ally paid to him; or
(5) By any combination of these methods as may be deemed desirable.
Since early this year greater emphasis has been placed on so-called
"forward pricing," or periodic checks, in order to reduce costs and thereby
eliminate the necessity of recapture of excessive profits. The War Depart-
ment has set up a separate division to carry out this policy.
4350 U. S. C. § 1191 (c) (2).
[Vol. 29
PRICE CONTROL AND RENEGOTIATION
The law specifically authorizes final agreements for a specified past or
future period when a contractor or subcontractor has renegotiated in good
faith and agreed to eliminate excessive profits for such period.44 Two pro-
visions effect a statute of limitation on renegotiation. One prohibits re-
negotiation after one year from the close of the fiscal year in which the
contract or subcontract was completed or terminated.45 The other authorizes
a contractor to file financial and cost statements for a prior fiscal period
and obtain clearance under the statute unless notice is received that renego-
tiation proceedings are to be initiated, and unless proceedings are actually
initiated within sixty days after the giving of such notie.46
D. Renegotiation vs. Excess Profits Taxes
In the course of debate before Congress and in testimony before various
committees, witnesses and some members of Congress predicted disastrous
consequences for industry because of operation of the law. The general
argument most often given was that the excess profits tax would recapture
excessive profits.
Failure of the excess profits tax to prevent profiteering during World
War I has been treated above in general terms. Perhaps at this point it
would be appropriate to elaborate somewhat on the inability of high taxes
to perform the same job renegotiation performs. Testifying before the
Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on June 30 of this
year, Mr. Maurice Karker, then Chairman of the War Department Price
Adjustment Board, commented as follows :47
"A few voices have been .heard to suggest that excessive profits
should be eliminated by increasing the corporate tax rates, even to the
extent of 100% of all profits above stipulated earnings over the earnings
of a corporation's base period, with a post-war refund of 10%.
"This suggestion overlooks entirely the inequities which would re-
sult from an elimination of capital investment as a base for the deter-
mination of taxable earnings; it would reward present inefficiencies
because of previous poor earnings irrespective of favorable changes in
ownership, management or products or high and effective degree of
participation and contribution to the war effort; it would destroy effec-
tiveness toward price reductions but would, on the contrary, encourage
high prices ;.it would make industry unmindful of costs which under
such a tax would so largely be paid for by the Government; it would
encourage reckless expenditure in the present in the hope of establish-
441d. at (c) (4).45 d. at (c) (6).461d. at (c) (5).47Hearings before House Naval Affairs Comm., 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
1943]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
ing added opportunity for earnings in the future; and it would keep
subject to renegotiation the many individuals and partnerships who have
no base period comparisons, thus creating illogical and unjust dis-
criminations between contractors and inexplicable confusions in pro-
curement."
In essence, renegotiation is part of the procurement function, and is not
in any respect a taxing function. Excess profits taxes, *moreover, operate
too late, and reach only what is left after 'all payments, costs and expenses
by a producer are met. Accordingly, they do not restrain the tendency
toward inflation. Renegotiation, on the other hand, should result in a re-
duction in the amount of money Congress would otherwise have to appro-
priate, and the Treasury would have to raise either through taxation or
increasing the national debt.
Finally, to 'depend oft taxes to eliminate excessive profits would be tanta-
mount to depending on a fixed formula. Neither can eliminate excessive
profits without the attendant "cost plus" evils. Neither provides efficiency
incentive.
To go from the general to the particular, a few actual examples will
emphasize the point. The' examples that follow are not at all unusual.
Contractor A in 1942 had a net profit after taxes of 125 per cent of in-
vested capital on gross sales equal to 15 times his peacetime average; net
profit after taxes was 23 times average peacetime profit. The net profit
after taxep of Contractor B ran as follows: 1936-$4,000; 1937-$7,000;
1938-deficit of $3,000; 1940-$4,000; 1941-$509,000 (1031 per cent of
net worth) ; 1942-$931,000 (including post-war credit of $254,000). After
taxes Contractor C had a 1942 profit of 100 per cent of invested capital
equal to 10 times peacetime profit on a gross 15 times peacetime business.
Net after taxes of Contractor D ran as follows: 1936-$3,000; 1937-
$10,000; 1938-$4,000; 1939-$29,000; 1940-$21,000; 1941-$252,000
(225 per cent of net worth) ; 1942-$1,519,000 (including post-war credit
of $686,000). These are only, a few of a large number of cases of profits
which have ballooned tremendously in spite of excess profits taxes but
which can be, and have been, brought into reason by renegotiation.
E. Aims of Renegotiation
Two months after their formal organization, the price adjustment boards
of the departments issued a statement on policy, emphasizing their recog-
nition of the need of maintaining the profit incentive, the traditional right of
American business. The joint statement said :48
48See C. C. H. War Law Service (Govt. Contracts 2) IT 27,275.
[Vol. 29
PRICE CONTROL AND RENEGOTIATION
"The profit incentive must be maintained in order to obtain more and
larger war production. However, there "is the obligation to keep prices
down and avoid an inflation that could become disastrous. The over-
all dollar cost of this war must be kept as low as possible to lessen
thereby the burden of taxes which the post-war public will pay to carry
the rising national debt.
"The right to a reasonable profit is basic. There are abnormal risks
and variable factors to be considered in realistically measuring a war
contractor's status. Each case presents individual problems. The Boards
encourage an uninterrupted, efficient and maximum production of war
goods on a low cost basis, and the efficient manufacturer deserves the
protection of a reasonable operating profit."
These views of the Boards, and earlier testimony of Mr. Patterson and
Maurice Karker, former chairman of the War Department Price Adtjustment
Board, were supported by a' special Senate subcommittee investigating the
national defense program.49 Its report, dealing with the renegotiation of
war contracts said:
"(1) Because of the wartime need for rapid procurement of materials of
war, new materials with which there has been no previous manufacturing
experience and other articles previously manufactured only in relatively
small quantities, some procedure for subsequent price adjustment is necessary
and desirable if excessive war profits and costs are to be avoided.
"(2) Taxes alone will not do the job because (a) higher corporate tax
rates are likely, to encourage higher costs and discourage economical pro-
duction; (b) no scheme of taxation has been devised which is sufficiently
flexible to provide an incentive for efficient low-cost production; (c) a
profit percentage which would fairly reward one war contractor with one
type of financial structure would provide inordinately excessive profits for
a third contractor with a still different financial problem.
"(3) War contractors in most cases can protect themselves against loss
by escalator clauses and other contract provisions for contingencies. The
people can obtain protection in many cases only through some procedure
such as renegotiation.
"(4) Experience has shown 'cost-plus' contracts to be worse than worth-
less in the effort to prevent excessive costs. They strongly tend to increase
costs instead of the reverse."
F. Renegotiation in Action
1. Results of Renegotiation.-The strong opposition expressed by in-
49SFN. REP. No. 10, part 5, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 2.
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dustry to renegotiation has gradually been reduced. Earlier fears have dis-
appeared and in many instances a number of comlianies have advertised in
newspapers of general circulation and in trade journals hot only the fact
that their war business has been renegotiated, but that they are proud to
report that they have attained lower costs of production.
Here are two examples of enlightened corporate public relations:
The annual report of Bendix Aviation Corporation, for the 1942 calendar
year said: "The greatly increased volume enabled us to improve efficiency
of operations and to reduce profit margins; [and] on the basis of the full
year's operations made it possible to return to the government $65,400,000
in renegotiating this year's contracts."
The 1942 annual report of United, Aircraft Corporation said: "The direc-
tors and officers wholeheartedly support the principle of renegotiation that
wartime contracts awarded under extraordinary war conditions can be ad-
justed to a fair and reasonable basis." This position was amplified by a
joint statement issued by Frederick B. Rentschler, chairman, and Eugene B.
Wilson, president of the company, reading, in parts, as follows: "Price
reductions, before excessive profits can accrue, tend to keep costs at a
minimum. In this respect, renegotiation is superior to a broad profit limi-
tation, which reaches profits only after they accrue and affords no incentive
to reduce costs. Renegotiation permits comparison of contractors in terms
of relative performance and leads to rewards for performance. . . . It is
believed that full acceptance by industry of the principle of renegotiation
is to its own interest, as well as that of the public."
The Automotive Council for War Production in its March, 1943 Bulletin
said: "Mr. and Mrs. America, however, are not alone in their efforts in
saving money so that the cost of the war can be borne. For, at the pro-
duction front of the automotive industry many sizeable reductions in the
cost of war materials are being effected. The price reductions in the cost
of war materials are due to savings brought about through improved de-
signs, improved material and through substitution in some cases of equal
or better, but less expensive materials."
The Senate subcommittee which investigated renegotiation stated that the
results obtained by the War Department Price Adjustment Board were
"significant."
Renegotiations of war contracts by the Price Adjustment agencies of the
War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission
through September 30, 1943; resulted in commitments for the elimination of
excessive profits in the amount of $4,747,176,000.
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This figure does not include those savings secured through lower prices
in successive contracts, not susceptible of accurate measurements or even
an approximate estimation, but -which are savings undoubtedly many times
greater than the measurable recoveries and price reductions in existing con-
tracts making up the figures here presented.
0f the total savings for the 17 months since the authorization of the
Price Adjustment Boards and their associated agencies $2,262,210,000"
represents the recovery of excessive profits realized, and $2,484,966,000
represents price reductions for future deliveries on existing contracts.
The breakdown by the four agencies was as follows:
Recoveries Price Reductions Total
Army $1,500,042,000 $1,753,874,000 $3,253,916,000
Navy 684,698,000 683,840,000 1,368,538,000
Treasury 2,890,000 2,890,000
Maritime Commission 74,580,000 47,252,000 1,21,832,000
Total $2,262,210,000 $2,484,966,000 $4,747,176,000
The rate of renegotiation is continuing to be substantially accelerated. As
of the end of September, written or oral agreements covering 1942 fiscal year
prices and proAts had been reached with 8,665 war contractors.
The over-all total of $4,747,176,000 does not tell the story as eloquently
as do the individual price reductions obtained for articles ranging from
bombers to buttons. Nearly every item which a soldier uses in his training
or in battle comes under the scrutiny of the procurement officers, the field
or regional offices of the Price Adjustment Board, or the Board itself.
For example, bomber frames in March, 1942, were quoted at $235,000
each, exclusive of armament, radio equipment, etc. By the first quarter of
1943, the price was down to $160,000.
A small item like forceps cost $2.75 each in March, 1942, but its price has
been reduced to $2.15 each. It is the constant watch kept on such small
costs that will affect the over-all cost of the war and contribute to economy.
The following is a list of typical items used by the Army showing com-
parative prices for 1942 and 1943. Concurrent with price reductions, quality
has improved:
Current Unit Price for Similar
Price 1942 Period
Bombers (Air frames only) .$160,000 $235,000
Fighters (Air frames only) 72,000 84,000
Human Parachutes (Assembly) 70 90
Cargo Parachutes (Assembly) 40 65
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Airplane Engines 8,000 15,900
50-Calibre Machine Guns , 3005O(approximate) 935
Attack Bomber (Air frames only) 64,000 81,000
Automatic Pilots 2,200 4,500
X-Ray Field Unit 487 589
Forceps 2.15 2.75
Sulphadiazine 11.25 20.80
For about a year after the enactment of Section 403, supra, criticism was
levelled at the statute because renegotiation was novel, although the armed
services had practiced price review in their procurement functions for many
years. The House subcommittee investigation, however, brushed away most
of the criticism, but suggested that some changes were necessary to 'obtain
:uniformity of practice among the Price Adjustment Boards.
2. Principles, Policy and Procedure.-For some months prior to the
issue of the investigation report, the four Boards then operating under the
act were engaged in drafting principles, policies and procedures, outlining
factors to be considered in determining the existence of excessive profits.
Just as Section 403 is considered the magna charta against profiteering, so
ar the principles, policies and procedures agreed upon by the Boards as
summed up in a Joint Statement the magna chtarta to assure industry as fair
and uniform treatment as is humanly possible.
The Joint Statement said :51
"In the present emergelncy the existence of excessive profits does not
necessarily indicate that a contractor has taken undue-advantage of the
government or that the contracting officers have failed to exercise
good judgment under all of the circumstances. Companies have been
asked to produce war equipment with which neither they nor others
have had any previous experience, and in quantities far beyond anything
previously contemplated. Under such circumstances the estimate of"
costs have necessarily been unreliable and when subjected to the test
of actual production have often proved to be substantially higher than
the actual costs. Consequently, many contractors have been left with
profits which they neither anticipated nor wish to retain. The true pur-
pose of renegotiation is to determine, preferably by agreement, the
amount of these profits which exceed a fair margin under all the circum-
stances,, and these circumstances are bound to vary in individual cases."
The statement then outlined general principles to be followed by the four
Boards in determining excessive profits. At the outset the Boards point out
that the stimulation of quantity production is of primary importance, thereby
5O0Negotiations now under way are expected to reduce the price materially below this.
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denying once and for all thit renegotiation must be considered as a punitive,
revenue measure.
The other points made are:
(1) That reasonable profits in every case should be determined with
reference to the particular performance factors present without limitation
or restriction by any fixed formuil. with respect to rate of profit, or otherwise.
(2) That the profits of the contractor ordinarily will be determined on
his war business as a whole for a fiscal period, rather than on specific con-
tracts separately, with the possible exception of certain construction con-
tracts. Fixed price contracts are negotiated separately from fees on cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts.
(3) That as volume increases the margin of profit should decrease. This
is particularly true in those cases where the amount of business done is
abnormally large in relation to the amount of the contractor's own capital
and company-owned plant, and where such production is made possible only
by capital and plant furnished by the Government.
(4) That in determining what margin of profit is fair, consideration
should be given to the corresponding profits in pre-war base years of the
particular contractor and for the industry, especially in cases where the war
products are substantially like pre-war products.
(5) That the reasonableness of profits should be determined before pro-
vision for Federal income and excess ,profits taxes.
(6) That a contractor's right to a reasonable profit and his need for
working capital should be distinguished. A contractor should not be allowed
to earn excessive profits on war contracts merely because he lacks adequate
working capital in relation to a greatly increased volume of business.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most important thing to bear in mind in connection with the renego-
tiation of war contracts in the United States is that in its administration
there has been adopted and followed the guiding principle that its applica-
tion shall provide incentive and reward for the production of more of the
requirements for war, more of everything in relation to the available man-
power, facilities and raw materials, at constantly decreasing costs of pro-
duction and therefore at lower prices; that there shall be greater reward in
dollars and in percentage of price to those producers who conserve the
supply of strategic materials; who obtain the maximum of output from
competent and devoted labor; who make the most of machine tools and other
facilities available, and who use power, supervision, overhead and the other
elements of production with rigid economy and high efficiency.
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